BUCKLEY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE BUCKLEY: THE NEW CAMPAIGN
FINANCE INCOHERENCE OF MCCONNELL V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
†

RICHARD L. HASEN

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McConnell v. Federal Elec1
tion Commission marks the culmination of an effort begun in 2000 to
shift the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence in an important,
though potentially dangerous, direction. Under pre-2000 jurispru2
dence, the Court (with one notable exception) upheld campaign finance laws only when the government demonstrated, with a reasonable amount of evidence, that the laws were closely drawn to prevent
corruption or the appearance of corruption. The new jurisprudence,
while purporting to apply the same anticorruption standard, does so
with a new and extensive deference to legislative judgments on both
the need for campaign finance regulation and the proper means to
achieve it.
There are signs that this shift is not merely the slipping of existing
standards. Rather, it appears that the Court’s jurisprudence is moving
in the direction proposed by Justice Breyer, toward upholding campaign finance laws that promote a kind of political equality. Justice
Breyer termed the rationale a “general participatory self-government
3
objective,” and explained its aim “to democratize the influence that
money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building
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public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, and encouraging greater public
4
participation.”
This apparent shift might be welcome news for those who believe
that the Court was previously too restrictive of efforts to limit the role
5
of money in politics in order to promote greater political equality.
But the means by which the Court has undertaken this shift have
proven problematic. The Court has continued to entertain the fiction
6
that it is adhering to the anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo,
perhaps because one or two members of the five-Justice majority making the shift in McConnell may be unwilling (at least now) to expressly
7
embrace Justice Breyer’s participatory self-government rationale. In
order to uphold bolder campaign finance laws purportedly under the
Buckley standard, the Court has: (1) reduced the evidentiary burden
that the government must meet to show that a law is necessary to
combat corruption or its appearance; (2) relaxed the level of scrutiny
applicable to reviewing campaign finance regulation; and (3) especially in the McConnell case, engaged in unusually sloppy and incomplete reasoning to justify its holdings. The result is jurisprudential incoherence and a lead opinion in the most important campaign

4

Id. at 253.
I have written in favor of the equality rationale in a number of places, including
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Hasen, Clipping Coupons], and Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) [hereinafter Hasen, Rupert Murdoch Problem].
6
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 2000 case, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink Missouri), 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring), setting forth the participatory self-government rationale. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, endorsed an equality rationale for campaign finance earlier
in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604, 649
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which has at least some overlap with the participatory
self-government rationale. Justice Souter has never explicitly endorsed the participatory self-government rationale, though he wrote the majority opinions in three of the
four cases shifting the Court’s jurisprudence in its direction. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539
U.S. 146 (2003) (Souter, J.); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado
II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (Souter, J.); Shrink Missouri (Souter, J.); see also infra Part I.C
(discussing these three cases). This leaves Justice O’Connor, who before McConnell
had written very few words in the many campaign finance cases she has considered
since she joined the Court and has now shifted her position three times on the constitutionality of limiting corporate election-related expenditures. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN
& RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 853, 952 (3d ed. 2004)
(discussing Justice O’Connor’s position shift among FEC v. Massachusetts, Citizens for
Life, Inc., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell).
5

2004]

BUCKLEY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE BUCKLEY

33

finance case in a generation that appears to pay only cursory attention
to the First Amendment interests that must be balanced in evaluating
any campaign finance regime.
Justice Breyer, in setting forth his participatory self-government
rationale, has noted the Court’s important role both in balancing
competing constitutional interests and in “evaluating the risk that reform legislation will defeat the very objective of participatory selfgovernment itself; for example, where laws would set limits so low that
by elevating the reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency to the point where they would insulate incumbents from
8
effective challenge.” The Court, however, has failed to meaningfully
balance or closely examine new campaign finance laws for selfdealing. Indeed, in McConnell, the Court in the joint majority opin9
ion appears to abdicate its role in this regard, hiding behind platitudes about evidentiary burdens and levels of scrutiny in upholding
various aspects of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
10
(BCRA).
Three examples demonstrate McConnell’s failure. First, the joint
majority opinion cannot persuasively explain under the Buckley anticorruption standard why it is permissible for Congress to regulate the
fundraising and spending of local political parties and candidates absent any evidence that local political parties or candidates can serve as
conduits for corruption of federal officials. The majority’s attempt to
distinguish the activities of political talk show hosts and newspaper
editors as non-regulable only further muddles the analysis. Second,
the joint majority opinion fails to engage in a serious analysis of the
potential overbreadth issues raised by regulating election-time advertisements that may not in fact be intended to influence and may not
even affect federal elections. Thus, the majority never expressly considers whether the statute, under Justice Breyer’s standard, “strike[s] a
8

Breyer, supra note 3, at 254; see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 403-04 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“We should defer to [the legislature’s] political judgment that unlimited
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process. But we should not defer in
respect to whether its solution . . . significantly increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective
electoral challenge.”)
9
In speaking of the “joint majority opinion” in McConnell, I refer to the Court’s
opinion discussing the constitutionality of Titles I and II of BCRA, jointly authored by
Justices Stevens and O’Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the
Court on BCRA Titles III and IV, and Justice Breyer authored the opinion for the
Court on BCRA Title V.
10
Pub. L. No. 107-171, 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a)
(Supp. 2003)).
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reasonable balance between [its] electoral speech-restricting and
11
speech-enhancing consequences.” Third, the joint majority opinion
never even mentions, much less explains, how the rationale that
would support regulating corporate-funded election-related spending
12
could apply to union-funded election-related spending.
The participatory self-government rationale may provide a persuasive reason for the Court to have upheld these provisions. But the
analysis is difficult and subtle. Shoehorning it into a Buckley anticorruption analysis has done everyone a disservice, giving short shrift to
competing First Amendment values and threatening to undermine
the very participatory self-government goals favored by at least some
members of the McConnell majority.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the preMcConnell campaign finance jurisprudence, contrasting Buckley and
the pre-2000 cases on the one hand, with the Court’s three post-2000,
pre-McConnell cases on the other. The recent trend, even before
McConnell, is inconsistent with the Buckley rationale, at least as Buckley
has been traditionally understood. The Court has replaced a general
skepticism of campaign finance regulation with unprecedented deference to legislative determinations on both the need for regulation and
the means best suited to achieve regulatory goals.
Part II uses three examples from the McConnell joint majority
opinion to demonstrate how the case fits into the new deferential
post-2000 campaign finance jurisprudence.
Part III points to signs apparent in the post-2000 jurisprudence,
and intensified in McConnell, that the Court is moving toward endorsing the participatory self-government rationale for campaign finance
regulation.
Part IV argues that that if indeed the Court is moving toward endorsement of the participatory self-government rationale, it should do
so more carefully. Thus far, the Court has given only lip service to the
requirement that it balance competing interests and police campaign
finance measures for legislative self-dealing. Had the Court engaged
in such balancing and policing in McConnell, it might have articulated

11

Breyer, supra note 3, at 253.
The majority opinion is muddled on the issue of disclosure as well, a point I
tackle in Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251 (2004). See also Elizabeth
Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 238 (2004) (arguing
“that McConnell v. FEC will protect most disclosure statutes from First Amendment challenges and allow reformers to adopt even more sweeping requirements”).
12
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a more coherent and subtle explanation for upholding—or perhaps
even struck down some of—the major provisions of BCRA. At the very
least, had the Court engaged in more careful analysis it would not
have been faulted for giving First Amendment concerns short shrift.
Part IV concludes by examining the danger that the Court eventually
will eviscerate the distinction between contributions and expenditures
without taking into account a key requirement of the participatory
self-government rationale: the need for vibrant election-related participation by a large group of non-governmental actors. In particular,
Part IV concludes that the Court should be wary of approving any additional expenditure limits that are not coupled with a leveling-up
mechanism, such as a broad public financing program.
Depending upon the next appointments to the Supreme Court,
the campaign finance jurisprudential shift, currently hanging by a
one-vote majority, could be short-lived or long-lived. At least for the
near term, and perhaps for much longer, it will be important to bring
some coherence to the Court’s analysis in this area. This Article is a
modest effort in this regard.
I. BEFORE MCCONNELL: THE SLOW DEATH OF BUCKLEY
A. From Buckley into the 1980s: Court Skepticism of Campaign Finance
Regulation
If, as it appears, McConnell was a compromise decision drafted to
take into account the competing and sometimes contradictory views of
the members of its majority, it is in good company. Buckley itself was
drafted by committee, and some of its internal inconsistencies may
best be explained by tensions in reasoning among the authors of its
13
various parts.
The majority and dissenting opinions in McConnell devote many
pages to debating the joint majority opinion’s fidelity—or lack

13

See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION
L.J. 241 (2003) (relating a chronology of the Court’s internal deliberations concerning
Buckley, from the post-argument conference to the issuance of the decision). The
muddled reasoning in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
may also be explained as the result of political compromise. See RICHARD L. HASEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO
BUSH V. GORE 113-14 (2003) [hereinafter HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW]
(tracing Austin’s drafting history).
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14

thereof—to Buckley; legal commentators have also begun tackling
15
Therefore, this Part gives only a brief description inthis issue.
16
tended to show the shift from past to present and to orient readers
unfamiliar with the campaign finance landscape to the important
precedents discussed throughout the rest of this Article. Readers already familiar with the major campaign finance decisions may wish to
skip to Part II.
The Supreme Court’s 1976 Buckley case considered the constitutionality of much of the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election

14

Compare McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655-58 (joint majority opinion) (describing how
the standards set forth in Buckley apply to the McConnell decision), with 124 S. Ct. at
744-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority improperly extends the reasoning of Buckley).
15
See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right of Association, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199, 204 (2004) (arguing that the notion of deference in McConnell is a departure from Buckley, but that both cases take a similarly narrow view of the
right of association); Robert F. Bauer, When “the Pols Make the Calls”: McConnell’s Theory of Judicial Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 17 (2004) (examining the relationship between the reasoning of Buckley and the notion of deference in
McConnell); Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley’s First Amendment,
3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 128 (2004) (arguing that McConnell discarded Buckley’s underlying
premises and almost entirely dismantled the limits that Buckley imposed on the power
of legislatures to regulate speech during political campaigns); Richard Briffault,
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147
(2004) (arguing that McConnell was, in different respects, both an extension of and a
departure from Buckley); Samuel Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel: The Constitutional
Morass of Campaign Finance, 3 ELECTION L.J. 259, 261 (2004) (“[T]here can be little
doubt, after Buckley, that there must be a significant rights overlay to the expressive
dimension of campaign finance regulation. . . . A striking feature of McConnell is the
almost complete absence of such conventional First Amendment concerns.”); Daniel
H. Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in Perspective, 3 ELECTION L.J. 277, 282 (2004)
(“Buckley is not only not dead, it may not be dying at all.”); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbearable Lightness of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299, 301 (2004) (arguing that
McConnell embraced Buckley’s rules while implicitly rejecting its rationale); Spencer
Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 305, 30509, 314 (2004) (arguing that McConnell was faithful to Buckley, and that McConnell was
an example of the Court “remaining true to its past opinions”); Roy A. Schotland, Act I:
BCRA Wins in Congress. Act II: BCRA Wins Big at the Court. Act III: BCRA Loses to Reality,
3 ELECTION L.J. 335, 336 (2004) (arguing that McConnell was a departure from Buckley);
Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps Reality,
Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 346-47 (2004) (“[BCRA] restores neither the system
passed by Congress in 1974 nor that system as trimmed back by Buckley”); Ellen L.
Weintraub, Perspectives on Corruption, 3 ELECTION L.J. 355, 359-60 (2004) (arguing that
McConnell was a departure from Buckley).
16
Some of the descriptions of the pre-McConnell case law below appear in slightly
different form in HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 105-14.
For a fuller description of the campaign finance jurisprudence, see LOWENSTEIN &
HASEN, supra note 7, at 717-1024.
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17

Campaign Act (FECA). The FECA Amendments were complex; they
provided for, among other things: (1) limits on the amounts that individuals or organizations could contribute to candidates (“contribu18
tion limits”); (2) limits on the amounts that individuals or organizations could spend, independently of candidates, to support or oppose
19
candidates for federal office (“expenditure limits”); (3) public fi20
nancing for major presidential candidates; and (4) the creation of
21
the Federal Election Commission. The Court upheld FECA’s contribution limits, struck down the expenditure limits, upheld the public
financing system, and struck down the means for the appointment of
22
members of the FEC.
Most notable for our purposes is the Court’s decision to uphold
the campaign contribution limits but to strike down the expenditure
limits. Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign financing was subject to the “exacting scrutiny required by the First
23
Amendment,” the Court mandated divergent treatment of contributions and expenditures for two reasons. First, the Court held that
campaign expenditures were core political speech, but a limit on the
amount of campaign contributions only marginally restricted a con24
tributor’s ability to send a message of support for a candidate. Thus,
expenditures were entitled to greater constitutional protection than
contributions. Second, the Buckley Court recognized only the interests
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption as justify25
ing infringement on First Amendment rights.
The Court held that large contributions raise the problem of corruption “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a

17

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2002)). The 1974 Amendments amended the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
18
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 n.12 (citing relevant statutory provisions).
19
See id. at 13 nn.13-15 (citing relevant statutory provision). FECA now treats
spending in coordination with candidates as a contribution, not as an expenditure. See
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (“For purposes of this subsection . . . expenditures made
by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be
considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”).
20
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-86 n.114 (summarizing the relevant provisions).
21
See id. at 109 (summarizing the relevant provisions).
22
Id. at 143.
23
Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
24
Id. at 21.
25
Id. at 26, 45-48.
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political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders.”
But truly independent expenditures do not raise the same danger of
corruption, because a quid pro quo is less attainable if politician and
27
spender cannot communicate about the expenditure.
With the corruption interest having failed to justify a limit upon
independent expenditures, the Court considered the alternative argument that expenditure limits were justified by “the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
28
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” In one of the most
famous (some would say notorious) sentences in Buckley, the Court rejected this equality rationale for campaign finance regulation, at least
in the context of expenditure limits: “[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
29
Amendment.”
Portions of Buckley certainly show some deference to legislative
judgments. For example, the Court refused to consider whether the
amount of the individual contribution limits (set at $1000, which is
30
31
The
equal to just under $3300 in 2004 dollars ) was too low.
amount of contribution limitations would raise constitutional problems only when it prevented candidates and committees from “amass32
ing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” But the overall
tenor and tone of Buckley was one of skepticism of legislative judgments about the need for campaign finance regulation.

26

Id. at 26.
Id. at 46-47.
28
Id. at 48.
29
Id. at 48-49. Seven of the eight Justices deciding the case concurred in this
statement (Justice Stevens, new to the Court, did not participate), though the drafting
history reveals that at least two more of the Justices were ambivalent about the equality
rationale. See HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 106-07 (noting that during the drafting process, Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan all expressed a willingness to defer to Congress).
30
Calculated using the “inflation calculator” at the website of the U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited September 15, 2004).
31
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. The Court also upheld an aggregate annual $25,000 individual contribution limit to federal candidates, parties, and political committees. Id.
at 38; see also Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (CMA)(upholding a $5000
limit on annual contributions by individuals and unincorporated associations to multicandidate political committees supporting federal candidates). For a further discussion of this aspect of Buckley and CMA, see infra Part IV.C.
32
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
27

2004]

BUCKLEY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE BUCKLEY

39

Thus, the Court rejected expenditure limits not only because they
interfered with free speech and association rights but also because—
given the Court’s narrowing interpretation of FECA’s reach only to
cover advertisements containing express words of advocacy (such as
33
“Vote for Smith”) —the limits could be circumvented easily, meaning
34
Inthat such limits would serve “no substantial societal interest.”
deed, the Court applied its narrowing construction to FECA’s disclo35
sure rules, leaving many election-related campaign expenditures
lacking any regulation whatsoever.
While we may debate in hindsight whether Buckley struck more of
a tone of deference or skepticism, there is little doubt that the immediate post-Buckley Supreme Court jurisprudence came down firmly on
36
the side of skepticism. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the
Court rejected a Massachusetts law aimed at limiting the participation
of corporations in ballot measure campaigns. Defending the law, the
state argued that corporate participation in the referendum process
would exert undue influence on the outcome of the vote “and—in the
end—destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process
and the integrity of government. According to [the state], corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other
37
points of view.” Noting that “the proper question . . . is not whether
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights . . . [but whether the Massachusetts law] abridges expression that the First Amendment was
38
meant to protect,” the Court held that “the fact that advocacy may
39
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.”
40
Similarly, in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC),
the Court rejected a city ordinance limiting contributions to ballot
measure committees to $250. The California Supreme Court had upheld the measure as a means of preserving “voters’ confidence” in the
ballot measure process, but the United States Supreme Court, in rejecting the ordinance, flatly stated that “the record in this case [did]
33

See id. at 44 n.52 (restricting the application of 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) “to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”).
34
Id. at 45.
35
Id. at 67.
36
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
37
Id. at 789.
38
Id. at 776.
39
Id. at 790.
40
454 U.S. 290 (1981).

40
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not support” the lower court’s conclusion that the ordinance was nec41
essary to preserve such voter confidence. The Court did not explain
what evidence would be sufficient to make such a showing.
And in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
42
(NCPAC), the Court rejected a portion of the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act that prevented independent spending over $1000
to further the election of a presidential candidate who had opted-in to
the public financing system. In holding that the law could not be justified on anticorruption grounds, the Court defined corruption as follows:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their
campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:
43
dollars for political favors.

Without elaboration, the majority stated that it would defer to the
lower court’s finding that the evidence of corruption or its appear44
ance supporting the challenged law was “evanescent.”
The one exception to the Court’s skepticism in the 1980s to campaign finance regulation was for limits on corporate involvement in
the political process. Thus, in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee
45
(NRWC), the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited corporations without shareholders from soliciting anyone but their “members” for their separate political committees. It accepted the government’s rationale that the law “ensure[d] that substantial aggregations
of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war
chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators
46
who are aided by the contributions.” And it held that this rationale
could apply even to an ideological organization that had adopted the
47
corporate form.
But even the Court’s special solicitude for campaign finance laws
regulating corporations was limited: in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
41

Id. at 299 (citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 614 P.2d 742
(Cal. 1980).
42
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
43
Id. at 497.
44
Id. at 499.
45
459 U.S. 197 (1982).
46
Id. at 207.
47
Id. at 205.
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Life, Inc. (MCFL), the Court held that it violated the First Amendment
to apply the FECA provision requiring corporations to fund express
advocacy for or against federal candidates only out of separate funds
to an ideological corporation that did not engage in business activities, had no shareholders, and was neither established nor would take
48
contributions from a business corporation or labor union.
B. The Austin Interlude
Recall that the Court in NRWC justified its law based upon the
“substantial aggregations of wealth” accomplished with the corporate
form that could be used to build “war chests” and incur “political
49
debts,” a classic anticorruption rationale. In MCFL, the Court in dicta
transformed that NRWC anticorruption language into what I have
50
termed a “barometer equality” argument, suggesting that corporate
spending might be limited because “[r]elative availability of funds is
51
after all a rough barometer of public support.”
In 1990, the dictum became a holding in Austin v. Michigan Cham52
ber of Commerce. At issue was a Michigan law that barred corporations,
other than media corporations, from using general treasury funds for
independent expenditures in state election campaigns. Under the
reasoning of Buckley, the law regulating independent expenditures
should have been struck down, at least absent proof that corporate
independent expenditures in fact allowed for quid pro quo corruption. Instead, the Court accepted the barometer equality rationale for
the regulation (at least as applied to corporations), while using the incorrect label of corruption:
Regardless of whether [the] danger of “financial quid pro quo” corruption
may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures,
Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corpora53
tion’s political ideas.

48
49
50
51
52
53

479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
459 U.S. at 207.
HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 110.
MCFL, 479 U.S. 197, 258 (1982).
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted).
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Austin marked the first and only time to that point that the Court
had upheld an expenditure limitation, and, as the 1990s progressed, it
54
was unclear whether Austin retained any vitality. The 1996 case, Colorado I, produced no majority opinion and a plurality opinion from Justices Breyer, O’Connor and Souter that tried to decide as little as possible. The dramatic shift began in 2000, when it appears that Justices
Breyer and Souter got their sea legs on the campaign finance issue.
C. The Shift in the 2000s: The Deferential Model of Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence
It is wrong to view McConnell as an isolated earthquake in campaign finance jurisprudence. Rather, it is best seen as the latest in a
series of significant tremors commencing in 2000 in Nixon v. Shrink
55
56
Missouri Government PAC, and continuing in 2001’s Colorado II and
57
2003’s FEC v. Beaumont. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in
all three cases.
In upholding the constitutionality of Missouri’s low campaign
contribution limits for state offices, the Court majority in Shrink Mis58
souri did four things of jurisprudential significance. First, the Court
ratcheted down the level of scrutiny from Buckley’s “exacting” level of

54

See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the
First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 383 (1992) (suggesting that Austin
might be an “aberration”).
55
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
56
533 U.S. 431 (2001).
57
539 U.S. 146 (2003). Writing after Beaumont but before McConnell, Brad Smith
already saw the trend developing. See Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform:
Searching for Corruption in All the Wrong Places, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 222
(“Beaumont on its own is not particularly significant, but combined with other recent
cases, most notably Shrink PAC and Colorado Republican II, it is significant indeed.”); see
also Fredric D. Woocher, Beaumont v. Federal Election Commission: A Pre-Cursor of
More Important Things to Come?, 2 ELECTION L.J. 255, 260-61 (2003) (“[T]hose interested in the fate of the BCRA would be well-advised to pay heed to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Beaumont.”).
58
I provide greater detail on these claims in Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri,
Campaign Finance, and “The Thing that Wouldn’t Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 49097 (2000).
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59

scrutiny to one in which interests need only be “sufficiently impor60
61
tant” and not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.
Second the Court sufficiently expanded the definitions of “corruption” and “the appearance of corruption” to justify campaign finance regulation. The Court explained that “corruption” extended
beyond quid pro quo arrangements to embrace “the broader threat
62
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”
As for “the appearance of corruption,” the Court remarked, “[l]eave
the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of
63
voters to take part in democratic governance.”
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court lowered the evidentiary burden for proving corruption or its appearance. The Court
began by noting that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up
64
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”
65
Although the Court insisted that “mere conjecture” was not enough
to support a campaign limit, it held that Missouri could justify the
need for its contribution limits to fight corruption or the appearance
of corruption by relying on some pretty flimsy evidence: an affidavit
from a Missouri legislator who had supported the legislation stating
66
that large contributions have “‘the real potential to buy votes’”;
newspaper accounts suggesting possible corruption in Missouri poli67
tics; and the passage of an earlier Missouri voter initiative establish68
ing campaign contribution limits.
Fourth, the Court created a difficult test for challenging the constitutionality of a contribution limit as too low to prevent effective advocacy. Refining (or changing) the effective advocacy test from Buck59

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court has
never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”).
60
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
61
See id. (“[T]he dollar amount of the limit need not be ‘fine tun[ed].’” (alteration in original, citation omitted)).
62
Id. at 389.
63
Id. at 390.
64
Id. at 391.
65
Id. at 392.
66
Id. at 393 (quoting an affidavit from State Senator Wayne Goode).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 394.
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ley, the Court stated: “[w]e asked, in other words, whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level
69
of notice, and render contributions pointless.” In an era of faxes,
web pages, and e-mails, it is hard to imagine any contribution limit
that would fail the test of constitutionality.
Shrink Missouri was also the case where Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, fired his opening salvo for the participatory selfgovernment rationale. Remarking that Buckley’s statement rejecting
the equality rationale as being wholly foreign to the First Amendment
70
“cannot be taken literally,” Justice Breyer posited that “constitution71
ally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation.” He
explained:
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a
matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is
not); but because it enables speech. . . .
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one individual
can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of
the electoral process—the means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action.
Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to
bear upon the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build public
confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participation and open
72
discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.

Justice Breyer then called for deference to the legislature’s understanding of “the threat to electoral integrity [and] the need for de73
mocratization,” though not for deference with respect to whether a
contribution limit “significantly increases the reputation-related or
74
media-related advantages of incumbency . . . .”
Colorado II continued the trend toward relaxing Buckley’s rules.
The question there was whether political parties had a constitutional

69

Id. at 397.
Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71
Id. at 400.
72
Id. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
73
Id. at 403.
74
Id. at 404. On this point, Justice Breyer wrote that the statutory limit was “low
enough to raise such a question. But given the empirical information presented . . . I
agree with the Court that the statute does not work disproportionate harm.” Id.
70
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right to spend unlimited sums in coordination with the parties’ candidates. FECA treats a coordinated expenditure as a contribution,
and limits the amount of coordinated expenditures that a party may
75
make with a party’s candidate. By a 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the
FECA provision, primarily on grounds that parties may serve as conduits for corruption: “[W]hether they like it or not, [parties] act as
agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated
76
officeholders.” In support of this conclusion, the Court once again
77
relied upon some rather casual empirical evidence.
One question left open after MCFL was whether it was permissible
for the government to limit campaign contributions by corporations entitled to an MCFL exemption from the ban on direct corporate ex78
penditures. In FEC v. Beaumont, the Supreme Court held it was permissible to ban such contributions.
Beaumont is significant in two respects. First, the Court called into
question Bellotti’s statement that the corporate form of the speaker is
irrelevant for purposes of determining the degree of First Amendment protection. Thus, the Beaumont Court declared:
Within the realm of contributions generally, corporate contributions are
furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ First
Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from
those of their members, and of the public in receiving information. A
ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public
79
of little or no material information.

Following Beaumont, it became an open question whether a ban
on corporate expenditures, even in the context of ballot measure cam-

75

See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (“For purposes of this subsection . . . expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their
agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”); 2 U.S.C. §
441a(d)(3) (“The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a
political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not
make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds [specified limits].”)
76
Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452.
77
See Richard L. Hasen, The Constitutionality of a Soft Money Ban After Colorado Republican II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195, 203 (2002) (explaining that the Court did its own research by “web-surfing to the FEC’s website to look at the pattern of PAC giving to
candidates”).
78
539 U.S. 146 (2003).
79
Id. at 161 n.8 (citations omitted).
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paigns, might also be said to “‘leave individual members of corporations free to make their own . . . [expenditures] and deprive[] the
80
public of little or no material information.’”
Second, Beaumont suggested that Austin remained good law,
though without quoting Austin’s most controversial language endors81
ing the barometer equality rationale. The Beaumont Court further
bolstered its analysis by applying Colorado II’s anticircumvention ra82
tionale to the case of corporate contributions, and noting that judicial deference was particularly appropriate “where, as here, we deal
with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially un83
changed throughout a century of ‘careful legislative adjustment.’”
What remained of Buckley after the three post-2000 decisions was
principally its rule against campaign expenditure limits outside the
context of corporate (and perhaps union) expenditures. McConnell
built upon the other three post-2000 decisions and, as the next two
Parts show, it calls into question even the contribution-expenditure
dichotomy. Buckley appears to be dying a slow death beneath the rubble created by recent seismic events.
II. MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: FIDELITY TO THE NEW
POST-2000 JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Basic Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Holdings of McConnell
Although the Court decided challenges to over twenty provisions
of BCRA, I focus here on the Court’s decision to uphold BCRA’s vari84
ous soft money provisions, as well as the Court’s decision upholding
80

LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 7, at 855 (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161

n.8).
81

See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153-54 (citing Austin for its anticorruption rationale).
See id. at 155 (“[R]estricting contributions by various organizations hedges
against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’”) (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 n.18 (alteration in original)).
83
Id. at 162 n.9 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)).
84
The joint majority opinion in McConnell gave this history of the rise of soft
money:
[P]rior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and
unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible
contributions to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal money”—also
known as “soft money”—to political parties for activities intended to influence
state or local elections.
Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment
of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading of FECA’s definition of “contribution” would have re82
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a BCRA provision preventing corporations and labor unions from
spending funds on “electioneering communications” except through
a segregated fund. The joint majority opinion of Justices Stevens and
O’Connor addressed the constitutionality of these provisions.
The Court upheld all of the soft money provisions of BCRA.
Thus, the Court held that it was permissible for Congress to (1) prohibit national party committees and their agents from soliciting, re85
ceiving, or spending any soft money (§ 323(a)); (2) prevent donors
from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party commit86
tees to help finance “federal election activity” (§ 323(b)); (3) prohibit national, state, and local party committees, and their agents or
subsidiaries, from soliciting any funds for, or making or directing any
donations to, certain tax-exempt organizations that make expendi87
tures in connection with elections for federal office (§ 323(d)); (4)
prohibit federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring or spending soft money in connection with
federal elections, and limiting the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in
88
connection with state and local elections (§ 323(e)); and (5) proquired such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities—including get-out-the-vote
drives and generic party advertising—in part with soft money. In 1995 the
FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs
of “legislative advocacy media advertisements,” even if the ads mentioned the
name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the
candidate’s election or defeat.
124 S. Ct. at 648-49.
85
See id. at 659-70 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (new FECA § 323(a)).
86
See id. at 670-77 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (new FECA § 323(b)). BCRA
defined “federal election activity” to include (1) voter registration efforts during the
120 days before a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-outthe-vote and generic campaign activity that is “conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot;” (3) any “public
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and
“promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” “a candidate for that office;” and (4)
the services provided by a state committee employee who devotes more than 25 percent of his or her time to activities in connection with a federal election. 2 U.S.C. §§
431(20)(A)(i)-(iv). The provision provided an exception, the “Levin Amendment,”
allowing state and local parties to pay for some of this activity partly with contributions
limited to $10,000 per person. Such funds could not be used to pay for any activities
that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and they could not be used
to fund broadcast communications unless they referred solely to a clearly identified
candidate for state or local office. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
87
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 678-82 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (new FECA §
323(d)).
88
Id. at 682-83 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e) (new FECA § 323(e)).
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hibit state or local officeholders and candidates from spending soft
money to fund communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and that promote, support, attack or oppose a
89
candidate for that office (§ 323(f)).
As for issue advocacy, the Court upheld Congress’s extension of
the existing requirement—that corporations and labor unions use
separate funds for express advocacy—to the funding of broadcast
communications that refer to clearly identified candidates for federal
office, made within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a
primary, and targeted at the relevant electorate where the candidate is
90
running for office (§ 203).
No doubt, some of these provisions could have been upheld as a
straightforward application of Buckley. For example, even Justice
Kennedy, who dissented from virtually all of the joint majority opinion, voted to uphold § 323(e), the ban on solicitation of soft money by
federal officeholders and candidates: “The making of a solicited gift
is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits
91
the payment (by granting his request).” But a number of these provisions required the Court to go well beyond Buckley.
B. Fidelity to Buckley or Fidelity to Shrink Missouri?
Here, I offer three examples to demonstrate that the joint majority opinion in McConnell fits much more comfortably with the three
other post-2000 campaign finance decisions than with Buckley.
1. Regulating Activities of Local Political Parties and Candidates
The joint majority opinion cited some pretty compelling evidence
that the national political parties had become conduits for the sale of
access to federal candidates and officeholders. Assuming for now that

89

Id. at 683-84 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)(1) (new FECA § 323(f)). The law
provided some exemptions when the federal officeholder was running for state or local office. 2 U.S.C. § 441(f)(2).
90
See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 694-98 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)); 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (new BCRA § 201) (defining “electioneering communication”). The
Court, by an 8-1 vote, also upheld the disclosure rules using the new definition of electioneering communications. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 689-94; see Hasen, supra note 12
(discussing McConnell’s disclosure analysis).
91
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 754 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Kennedy on this point.
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92

the sale of access constitutes corruption, or at least creates the appearance of corruption, the Court appeared on solid ground under
93
Buckley in upholding the national party soft money ban. The Court
also cited some evidence of a danger that state political parties could
94
become new conduits for the sale of access to federal officeholders.
But there was no evidence of the potential for the sale of access
through local political parties and plenty of evidence that BCRA’s soft
money restrictions could interfere with the purely local electionrelated activities. In upholding the constitutionality of BCRA section
323(b), the joint majority opinion cited to the deposition of a single
former senator, stating that “much of what state and local parties do
95
helps to elect federal candidates,” as well as to other depositions
showing that national party officials had directed maxed-out national
party donors to the state parties:
[I]n addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. Its
conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process
solely through national party committees. Rather, state committees
function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.
Indeed, both candidates and parties already ask donors who have
reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state committees. There is at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that
such donations have been made with the intent—and in at least some
cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal officeholders. Section 323(b) thus promotes an important governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to political
parties already have.
Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money donors would react to § 323(a) by
scrambling to find another way to purchase influence. It was “neither
novel nor implausible” for Congress to conclude that political committees would react to § 323(a) by directing soft-money contributors to the
state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted
to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly con92

But see McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 750 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“As a conceptual
matter, generic party contributions may engender good will from a candidate or officeholder . . . . Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism changed voting
behavior.”). I return to the issue of access as corruption in Part IV, infra.
93
See id. at 659-70 (discussing the constitutionality of new FECA § 323(a)).
94
Id. at 672-73.
95
Id. at 672 n.59 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 467 (D.D.C.
2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting former Senator Rudman)).
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tributed to the national parties. We “must accord substantial deference
to the predictive judgments of Congress,” particularly when, as here,
those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common
sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state
committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an impor96
tant governmental interest.

Note the absence of evidence that local parties had been used in
the past to circumvent federal contribution limits or to gain access to
federal officeholders. As the Chief Justice remarked in dissent: “I am
unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that local politi97
cal parties have any relationship with federal candidates.” The local
party ban therefore depended not on any evidence of corruption (or
even the sale of access) but on a supposition that local parties have the
potential to corrupt federal officeholders through the sale of access
98
based on the benefits they may provide to federal candidates.
The Court held that:
[The] argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for “public communications” do not corrupt or appear to corrupt
federal candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and Congress’ strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits. . . . We will not upset Congress’ eminently reasonable
prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and
local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the
99
soft-money funding of sham issue advertising.

Potential benefits turn out to be the key to the joint majority opinion’s upholding of a number of BCRA’s more controversial provisions.
Thus, the Court upheld BCRA section 323(f)’s requirement that state

96

Id. at 672-73 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 780 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
98
The Court also upheld application of the section 323(a) soft money ban to minor parties, in the absence of any evidence that the ban would prevent corruption or
its appearance. Id. at 669 (suggesting that a “nascent or struggling minor party” bring
an as-applied challenge if the ban prevented amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy). An as-applied challenge would be very difficult to meet under Shrink
Missouri’s standard for proving that a law prevents amassing resources necessary for
effective advocacy. See supra text accompanying note 69 (examining the standard in
Shrink Missouri). Indeed, in rejecting the argument that section 323(b) prevented state
and local parties from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy, the
joint majority opinion confirmed that, in bringing an as-applied challenge, “[t]he
question is not whether § 323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous
election cycles, but whether it is ‘so radical in effect as to . . . drive the sound of [the
recipient’s] voice below the level of notice.’” McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 677 (quoting
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397 (alterations in original)).
99
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 684.
97
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and local officeholders or candidates use only hard (federal) money
to pay for any public communication that refers to a federal candidate
and that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes such a candidate
(such as a local candidate who wishes to send a mailing in 2004 “urging voters to nominate Republicans like himself who support Presi100
dent Bush’s policies”). “We will not upset Congress’ eminently reasonable prediction that . . . state and local candidates . . . will become
the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertis101
Similarly, the Court upheld a ban on national party officials’
ing.”
soliciting of soft money for tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity on the same basis: “Absent the solicitation provision,
national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of
like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefit102
ing their candidates.”
The theory that local political parties, local officials, or non-profit
political organizations may become the next conduits for the sale of
access certainly is “plausible,” and under Shrink Missouri plausibility is
103
enough for constitutional regulation. The problem with a plausibility standard is the lack of a principled stopping point for legislative
reach. As the Chief Justice remarked:
Newspaper editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candidates
and officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter registration drive
conducted by a state party; there is little doubt that the endorsement of a
major newspaper affects federal elections, and federal candidates and officeholders are surely “grateful” for positive media coverage. I doubt,
however, the Court would seriously contend that we must defer to Congress’ judgment if it chose to reduce the influence of political endorse104
ments in federal elections.

100

Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 281; see also McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 683-84 (“Section 323(f) generally prohibits candidates for state or local office . . . from spending
soft money to fund . . . a communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or oppose a candidate for that office.”).
101
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 684.
102
Id. at 678.
103
See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 378 (“The quantum of empirical evidence
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”)
104
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 780 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The joint majority opinion’s answer to the Chief Justice on this
point was unsatisfying, expressing agreement without any explanation
that Congress could not regulate “financial contributions” to political
talk show hosts or newspaper editors “on the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate,” and noting, without citing any further evidence, that “[t]he close relationship” between candidates and their parties “makes state and local parties effective
conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and office105
holders.”
Given that most political talk show hosts or newspaper editors
would not be accepting financial contributions, the majority’s response was somewhat off-the-mark. The Chief Justice’s point was not
so much about contributions to such persons but rather to the possibility that Congress could limit their election-related activities on
grounds that the activities benefit candidates and affect federal elections.
In any event, the Court’s analysis on the local party and candidate
issue is clearly in line with post-2000 jurisprudence. Lacking reasonable evidence of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption,
the Court, as in Colorado II, shifted to the mere possibility of circumvention and then used Shrink Missouri’s lowering of the evidentiary
bar: once the Court declared a claim of potential corruption “neither
106
The
novel nor implausible,” it was poised to uphold the provision.
joint majority opinion’s analysis of the issue ended, consistently with
Shrink Missouri, Colorado II, and Beaumont, with a call for deference to
107
Congress.
2. Shallow Overbreadth Analysis on the Issue Advocacy Provisions
Before the Supreme Court decided McConnell, many people believed that the question of whether the Court would uphold BCRA
section 203’s extension of the separate fund requirement for corporations and labor unions depended upon the extent to which the law’s
bright-line test for electioneering communications would capture
105

Id. at 668 n.51; see also id. at 666 (“To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation.”).
106
Id. at 661.
107
See id. at 706 (“Many years ago we observed that to say that Congress is without
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation. . . the power of self protection. We abide by that conviction [today]. . . . (citation, internal quotation marks,
and brackets omitted)).
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“genuine issue ads,” that is, advertisements not intended to influence
the outcome of federal elections, such as advertisements run just before a presidential election by a corporation or union asking the
108
Few advertisepresident to get involved in a nasty labor dispute.
ments featuring express words of advocacy, such as “Vote for Smith,”
would not be election-related. On the other hand, it was unclear how
many advertisements referring to a federal candidate in the sixty days
before an election would be election-related. To the extent that such
advertisements were not election-related, the law might have been
substantially overbroad—capturing too much speech that Congress
would have insufficient reason to regulate—and therefore in violation
109
of the First Amendment.
The three lower court judges hearing McConnell devoted many
pages and considerable effort to this question and focused particularly
110
on two social science studies (the “Buying Time” studies ) examining
111
Judge Leon found that between 14.7% and 17% of
the question.
the ads run before the 1998 and 2000 elections were genuine issue ad112
vertisements. Judge Kollar-Kotelly disagreed with both the 17% fig113
Judge
ure as well as its significance for the overbreadth analysis.
Henderson believed the figure was anywhere from 11.38% to 50.5%
114
and, in any case, that the law was overbroad. The social science con-

108

See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1797 (2001) (arguing that whether bright-line tests are constitutionally overbroad depends on the frequency with which they capture speech not intended to influence the outcome of an election).
109
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (“[W]e believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”). For my own look at the empirical evidence of the potential for overbreadth with a BCRA-like bright line test, see Hasen,
supra note 108, at 1797 (2001).
110
CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS (2001);
JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME
1998: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2000).
111
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 367-73 (D.D.C.) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619
(2003); id. at 610-39, 719-52 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring); id. at 792-99, 890-918
(Leon, J., concurring).
112
Id. at 795-99 (Leon, J., concurring).
113
Id. at 636 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring).
114
Id. at 372 n.149 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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troversy spilled into the popular press after the lower court opinions
115
issued.
It was therefore surprising that the Supreme Court majority opinion devoted only a single paragraph to this issue. On the main point,
the Court wrote:
The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate
and were aired during those relatively brief preelection time spans but
had no electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties
and among the judges on the District Court. Nevertheless, the vast ma116
jority of ads clearly had such a purpose.

The joint majority opinion cited to those pages in Judge Leon’s
opinion containing factual findings noting that “[m]any so-called ‘issue ads’ by political parties were actually electioneering advertisements that focused” either on the positions, past actions, or general
character traits of federal candidates, or compared the position of two
competing federal candidates, but not upon upcoming federal execu117
The Court neither cited to nor
tive action or pending legislation.
refuted Judge Leon’s conclusion that up to 17 percent of advertise118
ments could be considered “genuine issue advertisements,” nor did
it explain how such a number could be consistent with the Court’s determination that a “vast majority” of such ads had an electioneering
purpose.
After concluding that the vast majority of advertisements featuring
candidates for federal office had an electioneering purpose, the Court
added: “Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in
the past, in the future corporations and unions may finance genuine
issue ads during those time frames by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad
119
from a segregated fund.” The Court’s solution to overbreadth thus
115

Compare George F. Will, 1,600 Pages of Confusion, WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at
A31 (discussing the “sham ‘social science’” that “powerfully influenced the congressional vote on McCain-Feingold and is the foundation of two of the three judges’ opinions that much of McCain-Feingold is constitutional”), with Thomas E. Mann, No Merit
in Brennan Center Smear Campaign, ROLL CALL, May 22, 2003, at
http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/mann/20030522.htm (asserting that the central
conclusions of the Buying Time studies are valid regardless of the McCain-Feingold
opponents’ critique of their methodology).
116
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 (citations omitted).
117
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
118
See id. at 798 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
Professor Goldstein’s testimony).
119
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
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created a potential new First Amendment problem by regulating the
content that a corporation or labor union might use to communicate
a political message.
Compounding the issue of overbreadth was the Court’s treatment
of “as applied” challenges, that is, challenges brought by individuals
engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment but regulated
under an allegedly overly broad law. In a number of places in the
joint majority opinion, the Court suggested that some First Amendment challenges to BCRA might come in the form of as-applied chal120
lenges after the law was put into operation. However, it is not clear
from the joint majority opinion whether a corporation or labor union
(or an entity taking corporate or union funds) that wishes to spend
unlimited funds on a “genuine issue advertisement” featuring a candidate for federal office could successfully mount such an as-applied
challenge. The Court did write that “we assume that the interests that
justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regu121
lation of genuine issue ads.” But in the portion of the majority opinion addressing Title V of BCRA, the majority characterized its holding
on section 203 as “upholding stringent restrictions on all election-time
advertising that refers to a candidate because such advertising will of122
This language, with
ten convey message of support or opposition.”
its original emphasis, suggests that corporations and labor unions may
not be successful in making such as-applied challenges; the Court instead appears willing to restrict all election-time advertising that refers
to a candidate as such because it will often be constitutionally subject
123
to regulation.
The joint majority opinion’s cursory analysis of the overbreadth issue is again consistent with the Court’s post-2000 jurisprudence. The
Court appeared to care little about the actual evidence, offering instead a conclusory statement that the “vast majority” of the advertise-

120

See supra note 98 (noting that an “as-applied challenge would be very difficult
to meet under Shrink Missouri’s standard”).
121
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 n.88.
122
Id. at 715 (Breyer, J.).
123
In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/bcra/wrtl_opinion.pdf, a district court refused a request for a preliminary injunction by a group bringing such an as-applied challenge.
Chief Justice Rehnquist then denied a request for such an injunction pending an appeal. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04A194, 2004 WL 2086023 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, U.S. Sept. 14, 2004).
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124

ments were sham issue ads, and deferring to a congressional determination that regulation was necessary.
3. Regulating Union Expenditures on Electioneering
Communications
The Michigan law at issue in the Austin case prohibited nonmedia
corporations, but not labor unions, from making expenditures funding express advocacy. The Austin Court held that the statute was not
rendered constitutionally underinclusive by its failure to include labor
unions:
Whereas unincorporated unions, and indeed individuals, may be able to
amass large treasuries, they do so without the significant state-conferred
advantages of the corporate structure; corporations are “by far the most
prominent example of entities that enjoy legal advantages enhancing
their ability to accumulate wealth.” . . .
Moreover, labor unions differ from corporations in that union members who disagree with a union’s political activities need not give up full
membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activities. Although a union and an employer may require that all bargaining
unit employees become union members, . . . . [a]n employee who objects to a union’s political activities . . . can decline to contribute to those
activities, while continuing to enjoy the benefits derived from the union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit on labor-management issues. As a result, the funds available for a union’s political activities more accurately reflects members’
support for the organization’s political views than does a corporation’s
general treasury.125

This reasoning not only provided a potentially good reason for a
legislature to exclude unions from the corporate segregated fund re-

124

This problem of the majority ignoring the evidence runs throughout the opinion. Indeed, the majority never mentions the point that, because the lower McConnell
Court was a three-judge panel, the Court apparently should have deferred only to the
factual findings made by at least a majority of the lower court judges. See Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 71 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“In light of these conflicting opinions and analyses, this case cannot be fairly decided on the ground stated
in the opinion of the Court, viz., that ‘[w]e accept the District Court’s finding’ . . . [because] Judges Moore and Feinberg, who comprised the majority below, differed . . .
with regard to the proof.” (first alteration in original)). Instead, the joint majority
opinion picks and chooses among the opinions of the lower court judges (primarily
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who would have upheld most of BCRA) for support without ever
confronting the evidentiary problem.
125
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66 (1990) (citations omitted).
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126

quirement, but also a challenge to anyone who would seek to justify
a segregated fund requirement for unions under the Austin rationale.
In McConnell, the Court upheld the extension of the segregated
fund requirement to unions’ electioneering communications, without
ever considering whether the Austin rationale applied. In a single
paragraph, the joint majority opinion resolved the issue: it simply
cited to Austin, Beaumont, Colorado II, and NRWC on the special need
to regulate corporations and the need to prevent circumvention of
127
valid contribution limits, and left it at that.
III. MCCONNELL AS THE LATEST TRANSITIONAL CASE TOWARD THE
PARTICIPATORY SELF-GOVERNMENT RATIONALE
128

At least in hindsight, Shrink Missouri, Colorado II, and Beaumont
may well be transitional cases toward the participatory self-government
rationale. Neither a substantial danger of corruption nor the appearance of corruption appears to explain a legislative need to enact very
low contribution limits, limits on party-coordinated expenditures of
hard money on candidates, or a prohibition on campaign contributions to federal candidates by ideological nonprofit corporations.
Which candidate for state or federal office would be bought (or even
appear to be bought) by a $1075 donation, an individual’s limited
hard money donation made to a political party, or a small contribution from an ideological corporation? Rather, these laws—as read by
the Court in the post-2000 cases—reflect a legislative desire to “democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public confidence in that process,
broadening the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support,
129
and encouraging greater public participation.”
McConnell, too, appears to be a transitional case, with even
stronger signals pointing to the participatory self-government rationale. The joint majority opinion no doubt takes pains to show its fidelity to Buckley, tripping over itself to apply the corruption (as anticir-

126

Justice Scalia suggested a less charitable possibility: the power of Michigan’s
labor unions over the state legislature. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96. The Court’s citation to NRWC in support of the
barometer equality rationale is curious, given that NRWC did not endorse that rationale.
128
In 2000, I suggested that Shrink Missouri could play a transitional role away from
Buckley. See Hasen, supra note 58, at 505-07 (discussing how each of the Supreme Court
Justices would be likely to read Shrink Missouri).
129
Breyer, supra note 3, at 253.
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cumvention) rationale to as many BCRA provisions as possible. However, a more natural reading of the more controversial aspects of the
joint majority opinion is as a sub silentio acceptance of the participatory
self-government rationale.
Certainly, the Court’s decision to reaffirm Austin and apply it to
electioneering communications fits into the participatory selfgovernment rationale. The Court can continue to dress up Austin’s
barometer equality argument as one based on preventing “corruption,” but no one is fooled. The only (arguably) legitimate reason
that a corporation or union should be barred from spending money
on election-related speech is because this would give its views disproportionate weight in society, and the legislature is seeking to democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral
process.
The participatory self-government rationale similarly explains the
joint majority opinion’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument that the
segregated fund requirement for corporate spending on electioneering communications is constitutionally underinclusive because it exempts media corporations’ spending on news items and commentary.
The Court found the media exception “wholly consistent with First
130
Amendment principles,” citing Austin’s rejection of a similar argument and a number of federal statutes providing advantages to the institutional press. The Austin Court had praised what it viewed as the
press’s “unique role . . . in ‘informing and educating the public, offer131
ing criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.’”
The joint majority opinion in McConnell goes further than Austin
by stating that Congress may not regulate “financial contributions” to
political talk show hosts or newspaper editors “on the sole basis that
132
This statement
their activities confer a benefit on the candidate.”
suggests that an exception for the institutional press from a separate
fund requirement might be not only constitutionally permissible, but
constitutionally required, to further the objectives of participatory selfgovernment—the institutional corporate press is simply more worthy
133
of protection than other corporations.

130

McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 697.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 667 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 781 (1978)).
132
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 668 n.51.
133
If so, it would apparently mark the first time that the Court has recognized special First Amendment protections for the institutional press. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (stating that Minnesota’s enforcement of promis131
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The joint majority opinion contains many more signs of the
Court’s acceptance of the participatory self-government rationale.
The Court not only upheld BCRA against constitutional challenge; it
lavished it and prior congressional regulatory efforts with effusive
praise as furthering the needs of a well-functioning democracy. Thus,
“BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of
134
‘big money’ campaign contributions.” It followed earlier legislative
developments including the enactment of FECA, through which Congress “continued its steady improvement of the national election
135
laws.”
The joint majority opinion further opines that BCRA’s “fidelity” to
the “imperatives” of “[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of
the government,” “sets it apart from the statute in Bellotti—and, for
that matter, from the Ohio statute banning the distribution of
anonymous campaign literature struck down in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec136
tions Commission.” The joint majority opinion never tells us precisely
how BCRA passes and the statutes at issue in Bellotti and McIntrye fail
to meet these interests. Indeed, the majority never defines the government’s interests in preserving the “integrity of the electoral process” or sustaining an “active” and “alert” citizenry. Are these interests
subsidiary interests that are protected by the recognized anticorruption rationale, or are they new interests through which the Court may
uphold additional campaign finance laws that further the goals of participatory self-government?
A final piece of evidence suggesting that McConnell is a transitional
case is found in the Court’s description of Buckley’s holding striking

sory estoppel against the media “is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations”); Houchins v. KQED, 438
U.S. 1, 14-16 (1978) (“[U]ntil the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free
to do, the media have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different
from or greater than that accorded the public generally.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 692 (1972) (denying that “the First Amendment protects a newsman’s
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source” in a grand jury proceeding);
see also Hasen, Rupert Murdoch Problem, supra note 5, at 1657 (discussing the media’s potential argument that they are “entitled to greater constitutional protection than the
general public”).
134
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135
Id. at 645.
136
See id. at 696 n.88 (alterations in original, citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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down expenditure limits. The joint majority opinion in McConnell accurately recounts the Buckley holding but pointedly fails to recount
Buckley’s explicit rejection of the equality rationale as a justification for
137
expenditure limits, that part of Buckley which Justice Breyer had said
138
It seems as probable as not that the
“cannot be taken literally.”
Court’s elisional history was intentional and not inadvertent.
IV. A NOTE OF CAUTION: APPLYING THE PARTICIPATORY SELFGOVERNMENT RATIONALE IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER
A. Missing from McConnell: Careful Balancing
and Policing for Self-Interest
Justice Breyer, in his Shrink Missouri concurrence, admonished
that “constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal
139
equation.” He directed his admonition to those Justices such as Justice Thomas who saw the First Amendment rights of free speech and
association as trumping most, if not all, campaign finance regula140
tion. But the admonition should apply as well to those Justices voting to uphold campaign finance regulation in the post-2000 cases and
especially in McConnell, because in their embrace of legislative deference, they have abdicated their responsibility to carefully balance
competing constitutional concerns and to police legislatively enacted
campaign finance regulations for self-interest.
Justice Kennedy’s partial dissent in McConnell sounded incumbency
protection as a major theme. “When one recognizes that §§ 323(a),
(b), (d), and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale
contemplates, Title I’s entirety begins to look very much like an in141
Justice Scalia similarly focused on incumbency protection plan.”
137

McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 647. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority
on the Title III and Title IV issues does mention the Court’s rejection of the equality
rationale in response to the argument of the Adams plaintiffs that an increase in the
hard money contribution limits constituted a denial of equal protection. Id. at 708-09
(Rehnquist, C.J.).
138
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139
Id. at 400.
140
For Justice Thomas, we now know that it is closer to all than most. Justice
Thomas alone rejected even the disclosure requirements of BCRA. See McConnell, 124
S. Ct. at 735-36 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The right to
anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defendants.”).
141
Id. at 753 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy pointed in particular to the fact that “Congress exempted its officeholders
from the more stringent prohibitions [on solicitations] imposed on party officials.” Id.
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142

cumbency in his separate opinion, citing to numerous Congressional floor statements that BCRA’s purpose in expanding the corporate and union separate fund requirement to electioneering commu143
nications was to limit the extent of negative “attack ads.”
The joint majority opinion’s response to the incumbency argument—tucked into a footnote apparently added to the opinion at the
144
end of the drafting process —is both unsatisfying and disingenuous:
Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaignfinance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a
particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the
appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are
145
closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption.

The response is unsatisfying because it incorrectly assumes that
identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny can substitute for a careful
balancing and the difficult judgment calls that the Court faces in
146
The response is disinevaluating campaign finance regulation.

The majority’s response to this particular point was to say that the provisions “allow[]
only minimally greater opportunities for solicitation out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official
roles.” Id. at 684 n.72 (joint majority opinion); see also id. at 680 (“[N]ational party
officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on
behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities.”). But the Court never
explains how it is that a member of Congress is less able to step out of her official role
for purposes of soliciting a contribution to a tax-exempt organization than the Chair of
the Democratic National Committee.
142
See, e.g., id. at 720-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that, though “the legislation is evenhanded,” it nevertheless benefits incumbents because, when “incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of
electioneering, incumbents are favored”).
143
Id. at 727.
144
I suggest that footnote 72 appeared late because it both misspelled “overruled”
as “overrruled” and miscited 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e) as 42 U.S.C. § 441i(e). Id. at 684 n.72.
145
Id. at 684 n.72. The joint majority opinion added: “At bottom, Justice Kennedy
has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous
scrutiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys
particular expertise—applies to assess limits on campaign contributions.” Id.
146
Cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nor can
we expect that mechanical application of the tests associated with ‘strict scrutiny’—the
tests of ‘compelling interests’ and ‘least restrictive means’—will properly resolve the
difficult constitutional problem that campaign finance statutes pose.”). Justice Breyer
suggested in his Shrink Missouri concurrence that a lax standard of review may provide
enough protection in campaign finance cases challenging contribution limits, because
deference there “does not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents
to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.” Id. at 402. But his reasoning
is unclear: certainly a very low contribution limit may benefit incumbents because of
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genuous because, as Part II illustrates, under the post-2000 campaign
finance jurisprudence, the Court (1) no longer requires “concrete
evidence” of corruption to sustain a campaign finance limit; (2) has
elastically redefined “corruption” so as to include even the eventual
threat of circumvention of existing law or potential benefit to an officeholder, without requiring any evidence to that effect; (3) has explained that “closely drawn” campaign finance statutes in fact need
not be “fine tuned;” and (4) has left open the “appearance of corruption” as a catchall for upholding any campaign finance regulation that
fails to meet the test for actual corruption whenever the government
can point to potential benefits to officeholders.
The Court should have taken the incumbency question seriously,
and more openly and directly addressed the kinds of balancing that
appeared to be going on behind the scenes in resolving the BCRA
challenges in any case. Instead of doing so, the joint majority opinion
repeatedly calls for legislative deference. It is easy to praise the
Court’s deference in McConnell as a corrective to the Supreme Court’s
147
But blanket calls for deferfederalism excesses of the last decade.
ence are misplaced if one takes the goals of participatory selfgovernment seriously.
In engaging in careful balancing and policing for self-dealing under the participatory self-government rationale, there is a place for
deference and a place for skepticism. In particular, the Court should
148
defer, within reason, to the value judgments made by legislative bod-

their tendency to be able to raise money more easily, as some have argued was the case
with the Missouri limits. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 15, at 342 (“In short, all Missouri enacted was a low limit on contributions directly to candidates, easily avoided.
Strikingly, Missouri has the 10th highest incumbent reelection rate for its legislators,
1980-2001. So much for protecting “the integrity of the electoral process.” (footnote
omitted)).
147
See Linda Greenhouse, A Court Infused with Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2003, at A38 (“[I]t is possible to view [McConnell] as something of a corrective, a pragmatic intervention . . . to lower the temperature of an increasingly fraught relationship
with another branch of government. ‘The court gave Congress space to breathe.’”
(quoting Yale Law School Professor Robert C. Post)); Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, In
Court v. Congress, Justices Concede One, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at B3 (noting that,
prior to McConnell, the Rehnquist Court’s “invalidations [of federal legislation]
seemed to herald a return to long-discarded ideas about states’ rights”).
148
On this important qualifier, see infra Part IV.C (noting that the Court should
remain cognizant of the fact that expenditure limits level down the amount of speech
to achieve democratic goals).
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149

ies on contested issues of political equality, but should not defer on
150
a close fit of means and ends. Leaving such value judgments to the
political process better serves the goals of the democratic system by assuring both experimentation and flexibility so as to strengthen democratic institutions.
Judicial deference to legislative value judgments in this area would
not be an abdication of the Court’s role to protect those speech and
association rights protected by the First Amendment. The Court
would retain a crucial role in assuring that the means the legislature
has put forward to promote equality concerns, such as participatory
self-government, are in fact likely to achieve those ends. The purpose
of this close scrutiny is to serve as a substitute for a test of legislative
motive. Legislators may be tempted to regulate in the name of political
equality but really to protect themselves from competition or to further their own agendas. But proof of such motive is often absent, suggesting the means-ends testing as a second best solution. When the
means and ends do not match well, the reason may be that the ends
151
asserted are not the ends intended.
B. Reconsidering the Three Examples Under a More Responsible Balancing
Approach
To give a better sense of how the careful balancing approach differs from both Buckley and the deferential approach of the post-2000
cases, I return to the three examples from the McConnell decision first
described in Part II: BCRA § 323(b)’s soft money ban applied to local
political parties; concerning corporations and labor unions, the potential overbreadth problems stemming from BCRA § 203’s segre149

Cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he legislature
understands the problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratization—better than do we.”)
150
I first advanced this idea in HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra
note 13, at 116-20.
151
Of course, in the face of actual evidence of improper legislative motive, the
Court should certainly disapprove campaign finance regulation enacted in the name
of political equality. For example, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978), there was strong evidence that the Massachusetts legislature acted specifically to ban corporate expenditures in ballot measure elections because corporations
had been successful in the past in blocking an income tax initiative favored by a majority of legislators (but that required voter approval for enactment). See id. at 826-27 n.6
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If inquiry into legislative motives were to determine the
outcome of cases such as this, I think a very persuasive argument could be made that
the General Court . . . simply decided to muzzle corporations on this sort of issue so
that it could succeed in its desire.”).
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gated fund requirement and the apparent lack of an as-applied challenge to the provision; and the Court’s failure to consider application
of the Austin rationale to labor unions.
Recall that the joint majority opinion explained the decision to
uphold the soft money ban’s application to local political parties as
based not upon any evidence, but upon conjecture that local parties
could eventually become conduits for the sale of access to federal of152
In its analysis on this point, the Court correctly deficeholders.
ferred to Congress, finding that it was a permissible goal to prevent
such sales of access, even if it could not be proven that access in fact
153
led to a change in voting behavior by members of Congress: it is a
reasonable, though contested, political equality determination that
154
access to federal officeholders should not go to the highest bidder.
But it is a much closer question whether Congress should be allowed, consistent with the First Amendment, to place a host of significant federal fundraising limitations on local parties’ get-out-the-vote
and voter registration activities and local candidates’ electioneering
activities solely upon the as-of-yet unsubstantiated fear that local parties could become the next conduits for federal corruption. There
may be good reason to believe that sale of access through local parties
might be less effective than sale through state parties given potential
problems of coordination and decentralization, making local parties
less valuable to federal officeholders than other means of support.
Absent at least some evidence that local political parties posed a danger of undermining participatory self-government unless regulated by
Congress, the Court likely should have rejected this aspect of section
323(b), or at least deferred consideration of the question until evi-

152

See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
Compare McConnell, 124 S. Ct. 619, 750 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (“[N]o
Member of Congress testified this favoritism [gained from soft money contributions]
changed voting behavior.”), with id. at 664 (joint majority opinion) (“The evidence
connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’
failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco
legislation.” (citations omitted)). Once again, the majority appears to have based a
factual finding solely on the evidence of a single judge, Judge Kollar-Kotelly. The majority cited to page 852 of Judge Leon’s opinion as support for the evidence, but there
Judge Leon wrote: “Testimony from other former Members of Congress describe, at
best, their personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money donations on the
voting practices of their present and former colleagues.” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
852 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154
I defend this point in Hasen, Clipping Coupons, supra note 5, and Hasen, Rupert
Murdoch Problem, supra note 5.
153
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dence could be gathered that local political parties could indeed play
155
this role.
The overbreadth question was similarly more complex than the
joint majority opinion admitted. Absent from the overbreadth analysis was some sort of qualitative determination that the extent of the
overbreadth was worth sustaining for the sake of a workable campaign
finance system. Thus, the majority never considered whether the provision, under Justice Breyer’s standard, “strike[s] a reasonable balance
between [its] electoral speech-restricting and speech-enhancing con156
sequences.” It simply concluded that a “vast majority” of the adver157
tisements were election-related and therefore subject to regulation.
Yet when it comes to overbreadth analysis, “[t]here is no sensible
158
substitute, at least in hard cases, for a forthright judicial balancing.”
The Court must inquire “whether the state’s interest is truly compelling, and, if so, whether that interest justifies as much infringement
159
on, and chilling of, protected speech as the statute effects.”
Thus, the answer to the overbreadth question for regulating
sham issue advocacy depends not only on the percentage of genuine
issue advertisements captured but also on the benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve compared to the costs of requiring corporations
and unions wishing to run genuine issue ads to do so only through a
160
separate PAC. Such a balancing of interests no doubt occurred beneath the surface in McConnell, even if the Justices failed to say so explicitly: eight of the nine Justices on the Court were willing to sustain
BCRA’s basic disclosure rules despite the fact that it applied disclosure
rules to the exact same percentage of genuine issue advertisements and
despite the fact that disclosure rules no doubt burden First Amend161
ment rights of speech and association. Yet the Court split 5-4 on ex-

155

The Court appeared to defer consideration of other aspects of BCRA pending
rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 718
(Breyer, J.).
156
Breyer, supra note 3, at 253.
157
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
158
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 894 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
159
Id. at 895.
160
See Hasen, supra note 108, at 1801 (“[I]n evaluating each case, there seems no
substitute for looking at the benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve in regulating
sham issue advocacy on the one hand with the costs of overbreadth on the other.”).
161
All of the Justices except for Justice Thomas joined in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion with respect to BCRA Title III, other than sections 304, 305 and 307. See McConnell,
124 S. Ct. at 640 (summarizing the votes of the Justices).
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tending the corporate and union segregated fund requirement to
electioneering communications.
162
For reasons I have explored elsewhere and will not repeat here,
I believe that Congress had a good reason to extend Austin’s rationale
to electioneering communications, despite the overbreadth problem.
But the issue is a difficult one. On the one hand, effective campaign
finance regulation had become all but impossible under Buckley’s express advocacy (or “magic words”) test. On the other hand, there is
something troubling about limiting the ability of corporations and labor unions to engage in political speech unrelated to elections at the
time when the corporation or union may be most likely to command
an officeholder’s attention. The McConnell Court’s decision, though
controversial, is certainly defensible under a participatory selfgovernment rationale.
What is indefensible, however, is the McConnell Court’s dismissive
approach to the question. Even more indefensible is the Court’s failure to explicitly leave open (and perhaps affirmatively to exclude) the
possibility of an as-applied challenge for a corporation or labor union
that wishes to engage in genuine issue advocacy using corporate or
163
union funds.
Finally, on the issue of including unions under the Austin rationale, it is hardly clear that unions pose the same dangers as corpora164
Perhaps
tions under the participatory self-government rationale.
the Court could have constructed a rationale based on the idea that
parity between unions and corporations is somehow necessary for par165
But the Court ofticipatory self-government in the United States.
162

See Hasen, supra note 108, at 1803 (“[T]he corrosive effects of corporate wealth
on the political process do not differ when the corporation sponsors a ‘Defeat Bonior’
advertisement rather than a sham issue advocacy advertisement criticizing Bonior’s
drug policy.”).
163
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that the joint majority opinion in McConnell suggests that there might be some “as applied” challenges to BCRA);
cf. Hasen, supra note 108, at 1802 n.114 (endorsing possibility of an as-applied challenge in appropriate circumstances).
164
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting Austin’s reasons for the
permissibility of not including unions in the corporate segregated fund requirement
for election-related speech).
165
As Dan Lowenstein observed before McConnell: “[T]he tradition over the past
half century of treating unions and corporations alike under federal and many state
election laws might lead the Court to uphold a ban on independent expenditures by
unions even if the logic of the decided cases suggests otherwise.” Lowenstein, supra
note 54, at 386 n.21. The unions themselves did not push the distinction between corporations and unions, see, e.g., Reply Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
McConnell v. FEC (No. 02-1755), available at 2003 WL 22002434, perhaps out of fear
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fered no such rationale; indeed, it skipped over the question entirely
as though it were self-evident.
C. The Future Constitutionality of Expenditure Limitations in the
Post-McConnell Supreme Court
1. Why the Court Might Be Poised to Uphold Some Expenditure
Limits
Perhaps the ultimate question about the direction of the post2000 jurisprudence is whether it may lead the Supreme Court to uphold expenditure limits outside the corporate and union context. After
Shrink Missouri was decided, but before Colorado II, Beaumont, the passage of BCRA, or McConnell, I suggested that the Court’s new deferen166
tial jurisprudence could indeed provide for such a possibility. After
recounting the spending of the Wyly brothers on anti-McCain sham
issue advertisements during the New York Republican presidential
167
primary, I wrote:
Suppose Congress, citing the Wyly advertisements, passed a law regulating such advertisements. Congress could redefine “express advocacy” or
electioneering to include [the bright-line test that had been proposed in
the McCain-Feingold bill and later adopted in BCRA]. It could then
subject independent expenditures to dollar limitations, as the FECA did
before that portion of it was struck down. A Supreme Court hospitable
to such a new law could say that Buckley’s decisions regarding expenditures and issue advocacy were made under the pressure of the 1976 election, before there had been an opportunity to gather evidence on the
corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from independent expenditures and before those engaged in electioneering routinely
evaded the FECA . . . . The Court could then say that evidence now
demonstrates that such expenditures are meant to influence the outcome of electoral campaigns. Further, even absent evidence of coordination, voters may believe that Wyly will “call the tune” for Bush; no

that Congress would respond to a decision striking down the application of section 203
to labor unions by repealing its application to corporations.
166
See Hasen, supra note 58, at 500-09 (analyzing the Supreme Court justices’ likely
interpretations of Shrink Missouri and predicting the demise of Buckley).
167
Id. at 503. The Wyly brothers are longtime Bush supporters from Texas. See
Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Richard Pérez-Peña, Role in Ads Puts Focus on Bush Friend, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at A16 (noting that the Wyly brothers were among George W.
Bush’s most generous campaign contributors during the primary). The McConnell
opinion mentions the activities of the Wyly brothers as well. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at
691 (“Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run these [sham issue] advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like . . . ‘Republicans for
Clean Air’ (funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly).”) (citation omitted).
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proof of a quid pro quo is required under Shrink Missouri, only the possibility that Bush might be “too compliant” with the interests of his benefactor.
The Court might not require much evidence from Congress if it believed
these claims were “neither novel nor implausible.” Perhaps it would be
enough to point to a New York Times profile of Wyly in which the Texas
director of consumer group Public Citizen recounted how Wyly, who has
an interest in a company investing in renewable energy, had offered to
help convince Governor Bush to include a provision in an energy bill requiring that certain coal plants reduce their pollution. The director said
“the episode ‘is a crystalline example of what donors get from Bush for
168
their contributions—an opportunity to make their pitch.’”

Four years later, with McConnell making up the fourth in the New
Deference Quartet, this scenario seems increasingly more likely. Indeed, the kind of evidence I cited in my 2000 article reads very much
like the kind of evidence cited by the McConnell joint majority opinion
to support the soft money bans. To be sure, such a change in campaign finance jurisprudence is not going to happen until five Justices
are comfortable overruling the central aspect of Buckley, which struck
169
But the reasoning of the post-2000
down expenditure limitations.
cases applies, without much of a stretch, to the Court upholding expenditure limitations.
If the relevant anticorruption question from McConnell is whether
170
there are sufficient potential benefits to federal officeholders, then surely
some limits on independent expenditures could be warranted. It is
no more “novel” or “implausible” that large independent spending
supporting a federal officeholder can benefit that officeholder and
secure access to her than that soft money raised by local political par171
172
ties, or spent by local officials on certain public communications,
can benefit the federal officeholder and secure access to her.
To be sure, the McConnell Court tries to rein in the potential benefit idea by pointing to the “close relationship” federal officeholders

168

Hasen, supra note 58, at 503-04 (citations omitted).
Cf. id. at 504 (“The Court would not even need to expressly overrule Buckley . . .
instead, it could distinguish Buckley on grounds that new evidence is available that was
not available in Buckley that would justify a law even under Buckley’s strict scrutiny-like
standard for expenditures.”).
170
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
171
BCRA, sec. 101, § 323(b).
172
BCRA, sec. 101, § 323(f).
169
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173

and candidates have with their parties. Corruptive potential must accompany the potential to benefit officeholders. But the Wyly brothers
had their own close relationship with Bush, and the McConnell Court
itself detailed the connections between federal officeholders and a
number of nonprofit political organizations that might engage in independent spending benefiting these officeholders. It might be that
such organizations would fall on the same side of the line as the parties, with “political talk show hosts” and “newspaper editors” on the
174
other side of the line. The organizations might not be, like parties,
175
“uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption;” but
rather, as organizations that have eliminated the middleman, they are
uniquely positioned to gain access to the federal officeholder by attracting attention through their independent spending.
There is even a suggestion in McConnell that the Court might uphold expenditure limits in the absence of a potential benefit to officeholders. This point would be especially important if state or local
governments attempted—contra Bellotti and CARC—to limit spending
in ballot measure campaigns, where the possibility of corrupting an
176
officeholder is attenuated, if not absent.
Much turns here on interpretation of McConnell’s cryptic, but cru177
cially important, footnote 48 of the joint majority opinion, where
the Court explained (or rather reinterpreted) its earlier decision in
178
CMA. CMA involved a challenge to FECA’s $5000 limit on contribu173

McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 668 n.51. The joint majority opinion also never explicitly endorses the argument put forward by the defenders of section 203 that Congressional power extends to any advertisement that may affect federal elections, whether or
not the advertiser so intends. Cf. id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
174
See id. at 668 n.51 (“We agree with The Chief Justice that Congress could not
regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on
the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate.”).
175
Id.
176
It is attenuated because officeholders sometimes link their fortunes to initiatives. Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REV.
731, 744 n.58 (2000) (describing several California candidates’ use of the initiative
process); Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 239, 241 & n.9 (2004) (making a similar point in the context of the California recall election).
177
124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48. I thank Marty Lederman for first causing me to consider
the importance of footnote 48.
178
453 U.S. 182 (1981). A four-Justice plurality opinion as well as Justice Blackmun’s separate concurring opinion appeared to focus solely on the pass-through problem. Id. at 198 (plurality opinion) (“If appellants’ position . . . is accepted, then both
these contribution limitations could be easily evaded.”); id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“I conclude that contributions to multicandidate political committees may
be limited to $5,000 per year as a means of preventing evasion of the limitations [those
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tions to PACs. The McConnell Court stated that the statute at issue in
CMA was justified not only to prevent “pass-throughs” of contributions
to federal candidates but also as an appropriate measure to limit contributions funding “express advocacy and numerous other noncoor179
The footnote’s statement that it could be
dinated expenditures.”
consistent with the First Amendment to limit contributions funding
independent expenditures suggests that it is perhaps also consistent
with the First Amendment to limit independent expenditures them180
selves.
The extent of footnote 48’s reach is unclear. On what basis might
contributions to fund independent expenditures be limited? Perhaps
the Court’s point in the footnote is simply a variation of the potential
benefits theme: contributions funding independent expenditures
may benefit officeholders and secure access to them. If that is correct,
however, independent expenditures themselves in candidate elections
may serve the same purpose, and the entire Buckley edifice, built on a
foundation of a contribution-expenditure dichotomy, falls.
On the other hand, perhaps the Court had some other idea in
mind as to why such a law would survive First Amendment challenge.
For example, perhaps such laws might be justified on political equality
grounds. If it turns out that the reasoning is not tied to potential
benefits of officeholders or the potential to corrupt them, then application of expenditure limits even in ballot measure campaigns seems
constitutionally possible. Again, the Buckley edifice falls. Is that what
the Court really intended buried in a few sentences of a footnote in
one of the longest cases in Supreme Court history?

under 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) & 441(a)(a)(3)], on contributions to a candidate or
his authorized campaign committee . . . .”). Justice Blackmun then went on to
“stress . . . that a different result would follow if [the statute] were applied to contributions to a political committee established for the purpose of making independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates.” Id; see also Lincoln Club v. City of
Irvine, 292 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (raising but not resolving the constitutionality
of limiting contributions to independent expenditure committees).
The McConnell Court pointed also at Buckley’s decision to uphold a $25,000 aggregate yearly limit on individual contributions to candidates’ political committees and
party committees. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38).
179
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48.
180
The question is at the heart of regulating 527 committees that have been active
in the 2004 presidential election. See Richard L. Hasen, Commentary, A GOP Flip-Flop
on Political Ads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at M5 (“The really interesting question is
whether these ads should be illegal. The question goes to the heart of why we regulate
campaign money in the first place.”).
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2. Examining the Constitutionality of Expenditure Limits Under the
Participatory Self-Government Rationale
Although it is now easy to imagine how the McConnell majority
could write an opinion upholding an expenditure limit under an anticircumvention/anticorruption/potential benefit theory, one hopes
the Court would not do so without engaging in careful balancing and
policing for legislative self-interest. Expenditure limits may tend to
benefit incumbents by giving them a chance to limit funds spent opposing them. Even putting aside self-interest, expenditure limits raise
troubling questions under the participatory self-government rationale
to the extent they inhibit vibrant election-related participation by a
wide group of nongovernmental actors. The McConnell Court may
have oversold the value of the institutional press in fostering this debate and undersold the value of corporate and other speech in Beau181
mont.
These points raise difficult questions involving theory (what is the
best form of representative government?), facts (to what extent do
expenditure limits inhibit robust political speech?), and division of labor (to what extent should the courts defer to legislatures, which have
greater expertise in political affairs but also a serious agency problem?).
At bottom, the problem with expenditure limits is that they
182
achieve political equality by leveling down the amount of speech.
Leveling down political speech seems antithetical to the participatory
self-government rationale. Expenditure limits only make sense from
the point of view of participatory self-government when they are coupled with level-up mechanisms that increase the vibrancy and diversity
of election-related speech. Full public financing of campaigns, especially through a market-mimicking voucher program, could well
183
Without such a level-up mechanism, the
accomplish these goals.
Court should be wary of deferring to the genuinely-made value judgment of a legislative body that would impose expenditure limits in the
name of furthering democratic values.

181

See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (analyzing the holding and implications of Beaumont).
182
See Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211, 247 (1984)(criticizing
the “inegalitarian policy outcomes” of a leveling-down approach).
183
See Hasen, Clipping Coupons, supra note 5, at 21 (defending voucher proposal
that both levels-up and levels-down).
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CONCLUSION
Reformers have much to cheer in the McConnell decision. It is essentially a green light to enact any kind of rational campaign finance
plan in candidate elections—at least any rational plan that does not
include expenditure limits applied outside the corporate/union context or limits applied to media corporations. But after the cheering
subsides, the reform community needs to take a hard look at what
McConnell and the other post-2000 jurisprudence have wrought. Few
reformers will be cheered in the long run by campaign finance laws
that are indeed intended to limit competition or that balance interests
(expressly or not) in ways that squelch rigorous debate about political
(including electoral) issues.
In the short term, the job of balancing and policing will fall to legislatures and to the public interest organizations that monitor them.
Lower courts showing fidelity to McConnell will have a difficult time
striking down most campaign finance regulation, and the possibility of
abuse, especially on the state and local level, seems apparent.
In the long term, the Court will have to consider whether the considerable deference advanced in McConnell does an adequate job of
protecting constitutional interests on both sides of the legal equation.
After pushing the point for many years that the First Amendment is
not everything, the reform community must admit that it is something: a value that must be taken into account, not only in balance
with anticorruption measures, but also in assuring true participatory
self-government.

